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NARROWING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SENTENCING THROUGH A 
SYSTEM OF MANDATORY DOWNWARD DEPARTURES 
 
By Douglas Smith* 
I  met Allen in Danville, Virginia in the spring of 1993 when I was the Safety and Security Manager for the Danville Redevelopment and Housing Authority.  Allen was 16 and 
lived in a public housing development with his mother and sister.  
A model teenager in many respects and an anomaly among those 
I often encountered in public housing.   Allen was highly moti-
vated, attended school regularly, and had aspirations of attending 
college.  Most importantly, he avoided all of the pitfalls that 
doomed many of his friends: drug and alcohol use, premature 
parenthood, and contact with the criminal justice system. Then 
on October 16, 1994, after succumbing to peer pressure and in a 
semi-drunken haze, Allen participated in the armed robbery of a 
Pizza Hut.  The police caught up with him after the robbery at 
the local hospital, where he was being treated for a gunshot 
wound to his leg, which he sustained accidentally after abandon-
ing the robbery.1 He initially lied to the police about the circum-
stances of injury. However, the next day, he voluntarily admitted 
being involved in the robbery. After taking his statement, the 
police arrested and charged him with armed robbery and use of a 
firearm in the commission of a felony.   
Allen decided to plead guilty to the charges.  He had many 
mitigating factors in his favor including his regular high school 
attendance, his cooperation with the police in identifying his 
accomplices, the fact that no one was injured during the robbery, 
his clean adult record, and testimony received by the court from 
family members, one of his high school teachers, and myself.  
Yet, the judge sentenced Allen to 40 years for armed robbery 
with ten years suspended, and three years for the use of a firearm 
in the commission of a felony, all to be served consecutively.  
His sentence was nearly four and one half times the national av-
erage maximum state court sentence for robbery and virtually 
double the national average maximum state court sentence for 
murder.2  The only “positive” was that Allen was eligible for 
parole, having committed his offense less than two months be-
fore Virginia abolished parole. 
As of March 2, 2005, Allen had served ten years in prison, 
more than double the average time served by individuals with a 
prior felony record who committed robbery before Virginia’s 
abolition of parole,3 and nearly three years more than the average 
number of years served by those without a prior felony record 
who committed robbery after the abolition of parole.4   If Allen 
remained imprisoned until his mandatory release date of 2012, 
he will have served 17 years, a sentence virtually identical to the 
average post-abolition robbery sentence for those with the most 
serious felony records.5   
The shocking reality is that Allen’s sentence was well within 
the range of punishment available for his crimes.6 Most state 
courts hold that prison sentences within the legislatively pre-
scribed range of a valid statute do not constitute cruel and un-
usual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.7  Moreover, in 
Virginia, a sentence that does not exceed the maximum sentenc-
ing guidelines prescribed by statute is not reversible on grounds 
of abuse of discretion.8 Thus, the validity of Allen’s sentence 
seemed indisputable, albeit harsh for a first-time offender with 
such strong mitigating factors.  Indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
the sentence Allen would have received if he had a prior felony 
record.  The court reporter’s notes suggest that the judge 
weighed societal intolerance of robbery, the need to protect vic-
tims, the fact that Allen was armed and masked, and the fact that 
shots were fired during the robbery in determining a sentence.  
While these are legitimate and reasonable concerns, news reports 
on arguably more heinous crimes9 coupled with my own obser-
vations of the racial dynamic in Danville, suggested that race 
may have affected the judge’s decision. 
Without assuming conscious or unconscious racial bias, this 
essay examines racial sentencing disparities between African-
American and White-American offenders at the state and federal 
levels,10 and advocates a legislative solution to ensure that miti-
gating factors are not arbitrarily disregarded by judges.  This 
proposal will address the U.S. Supreme Court’s assertion that         
“[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our 
criminal justice system.”11  Removing judicial discretion in 
downward departures may promote racial parity in criminal sen-
tencing.   
This article first provides a brief historical overview of racial 
sentencing disparities, discussing indeterminate and determinate 
sentencing.  It then briefly discusses the futility of pursuing a 
judicial solution, focusing on key decisions by the Supreme 
Court in Washington v. Davis, McCleskey v. Kemp, and United 
States v. Armstrong, and will analyze two radical and unrealistic 
proposals for reducing racial sentencing disparities.  The article 
then proposes mandatory downward departures, considering 
standardized offender characteristics and mitigating factors, in-
cluding the pros and cons of the proposal.  Finally, it concludes 
that society should use non-race based solutions such as manda-
tory downward departures in sentencing to create parity in sen-
tencing between White Americans and African Americans and 
restore confidence and fairness to the criminal justice system. 
RADICAL DISPARITIES                                       
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
As a historical matter, African Americans have routinely 
been singled out for harsher punishment than White Americans. 
During slavery, states enacted separate statutes known as “Slave 
Codes” to punish slaves who committed specified offenses.12 
Punishment under the Slave Codes for even minor transgressions 
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was often brutal and inhumane.13 Meanwhile, these same codes 
completely exonerated slave masters who killed slaves in the 
course of punishing them for “resisting.”14  
African Americans fared little better under the Black Codes 
of 1865, which controlled the movement and activities of newly 
freed slaves.15 The Black Codes penalized African Americans for 
“offenses” similar to those for which they faced punishment un-
der slavery.16 While the Black Codes were eventually struck 
down by Congress after the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments were passed,17 and African Americans gained certain 
rights and freedoms during Reconstruction, these victories were 
eventually whittled away by Jim Crow laws in the wake of 
Plessy v. Ferguson.18 Under Jim Crow laws, African Americans 
continued to face differential treatment and punishment under 
state laws.19  
Above and beyond Jim Crow laws, African-American of-
fenders were subject to the vagaries of indeterminate sentencing, 
a punishment philosophy which emerged during Reconstruction, 
eventually becoming the predominant method until the 1960s.20 
Under indeterminate sentencing schemes, punishment is indi-
vidually tailored to an offender’s unique situation or circum-
stances.  The trial judge has complete discretion to determine a 
sentence that falls within legislatively-
determined minimum and maximum 
terms applicable to each offense.21 The 
driving philosophical force of indeter-
minate sentencing is based on the the-
ory that crime is a “moral disease” and 
punishment’s goal is “reformation of 
criminals...not the infliction of vindic-
tive suffering.”22  The ultimate length 
of an offender’s sentence is determined 
by a parole board based on its view of 
whether or not the offender has been rehabilitated after a period 
of incarceration.23 
While indeterminate sentencing schemes enjoyed early sup-
port24 and appeared arguably beneficial to offenders in theory, 
history suggests that, in practice, due to their highly discretionary 
nature, African-American offenders were often victims of racial 
bias under such schemes. Indeed, as early as 1933, researchers 
noted “striking differences and wide disparity in sentence type 
and length” under indeterminate sentencing schemes and sug-
gested that “racial discrimination [manifested] itself in the form 
of more severe sentences for minority defendants than for 
equally situated white offenders.”25 The futility of addressing 
these disparities was increased by the fact that such sentences 
were generally not reviewable and judges were not required to 
explain their rationale.26 As parole was used to alleviate prison 
overcrowding rather than for rehabilitation,27 doubts about the ad 
hoc nature of parole board decisions, the potential for misleading 
victims, and high recidivism rates prompted concerns about dis-
crimination in the parole process.28  By the early 1970s, mount-
ing research suggested rehabilitation had failed,29 and growing 
concerns about sentencing disparities, prison overcrowding, and 
the perception that criminals were being coddled signaled the 
demise of indeterminate sentencing.30 
In the mid-1970s, as support for indeterminate sentencing 
declined, scholars and researchers advocated a less discretionary 
form of sentencing known as determinate or presumptive sen-
tencing, in which similarly situated offenders receive similar 
sentences.31 At the heart of the proposal was a mandate to create 
a set of guidelines to establish specified periods of incarceration 
for corresponding levels of seriousness.32 Judges would then 
have limited discretion to consider aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances which would raise or lower the presumptive sen-
tence respectively.33 Under the proposal, parole would be phased 
out.34  While early determinate sentencing proposals did not 
completely rule out rehabilitation as a goal, determinate sentenc-
ing has often been characterized as eschewing the rehabilitation 
of offenders in favor of pursuing retribution or “just desserts” as 
its main goal.35   
In 1984 Congress established the U.S. Sentencing Commis-
sion to develop sentencing guidelines similar to those originally 
proposed by advocates of reduced judicial discretion.36 The 
Commission was authorized to consider the relevance of “an 
offender’s age, education, vocational skills, mental and emo-
tional condition, physical condition 
(including drug dependence, previous 
employment record, family and com-
munity ties, role in the offense, crimi-
nal history, and dependence on crimi-
nal activity for a livelihood.”37  The 
final draft guidelines retained some 
original features but fell short in other 
respects in that these guidelines for 
criminal offense levels failed to ac-
count for the full panoply of potentially 
relevant offender characteristics originally suggested by Con-
gress in the enabling legislation.38 Also absent was a clear pur-
pose for the sanctions, despite the clear legislative history in 
which Congress sought to “require the judge to consider the four 
purposes of sentencing [rehabilitation, retribution, incapacitation, 
and restitution] before imposing a particular sentence.”39  
State reforms of earlier indeterminate sentencing schemes 
preceded federal reforms, albeit for many of the same reasons 
which drove federal reforms.40 Today, approximately 25  states 
have some form of either guideline-based sentencing, presump-
tive sentencing, or a hybrid of the two.41 Many states also estab-
lished mandatory minimum penalties for certain offenses that a 
judge was required to impose upon conviction.42 
However, the statistics gathered after most federal and state 
sentencing reforms were implemented are startling.43 A Bureau 
of Justice Statistics study on trends in discretionary and manda-
tory parole reported that, on average, African Americans remain 
incarcerated three months longer than White Americans in dis-
cretionary parole systems and seven months longer than White 
Americans in mandatory state parole systems. In studying the 
issue, several states invariably agreed that racial bias has at least 
His sentence was nearly four and 
one half times the national       
average for robbery and virtually 
double the national average 
maximum state court sentence for 
murder. 
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some influence on the decision-making process in state criminal 
justice systems.44 
Though much of the literature acknowledges the presence of 
at least some racial bias at all levels of the criminal justice sys-
tem,45 from arrest to incarceration, many other factors are cited 
for their “superior explanatory power” - in particular, African-
American patterns of offending and prior criminal records of 
African-American offenders.46  Furthermore, some scholars as-
sert that society need not be concerned about racial disparities in 
the criminal justice system if the system appears, for the most 
part, objective and unbiased.47  Despite these arguments, there 
are a number of valid reasons why racial sentencing disparities 
warrant concern, chief of which is that most researchers even 
those that conclude that legally relevant sentencing factors are 
the chief reason for racial sentencing disparities, refuse to dis-
miss the possibility that racial discrimination does play a role in 
sentencing.48  
WHY “POSSIBLE” SOLUTIONS ARE NOT     
“PROBABLE” SOLUTIONS 
Pursuing a constitutional remedy for racial sentencing dis-
parities, specifically an Equal Protection challenge, would be an 
exercise in futility because the court has typically upheld govern-
ment action with a racially disparate impact.49  McCleskey and 
Armstrong demonstrate that, notwithstanding clear evidence of 
racial bias, claims that reach the threshold for an equal protection 
violation based on disparate impacts are “available in theory, but 
unattainable in practice.”50 
Additionally, two methods pro-
posed to cope with racial sentencing 
disparities are affirmative action and 
racially-based jury nullification. Both 
remedies are targeted primarily at non-
violent drug offenders engaged in 
“victimless crimes,” which seek to 
ameliorate concerns about releasing 
violent minority offenders into the 
community and providing the same 
opportunities for community-based 
treatment, in lieu of incarceration, as are afforded White drug 
offenders.51  Butler justifies affirmative action using a modified 
version of the “diversity” rationale he calls “parity diversity,”52 
which presumes that disproportionate African-American crimi-
nality results from “the distorting influence of [W]hite suprem-
acy on the political and legal processes by which ‘criminals’ are 
named and selected for punishment”53  In order to combat this 
influence, the criminal justice system must artificially limit the 
number of non-violent African-American drug offenders that 
come within its purview, regardless of their guilt or innocence, 
to achieve the parity that would be had in a truly color-blind sys-
tem.  
Butler’s racially-based jury nullification thesis rests on a 
similar rationale.  To combat the influence of White supremacy 
in the criminal justice system, African-Americans may be mor-
ally obligated to engage in jury nullification (i.e.  the acquittal of 
some non-violent African-American drug offenders without re-
gard to their culpability).54 Butler seeks “subversion of American 
criminal justice” by using jury nullification by African Ameri-
cans “to cause retrial after retrial, until, finally, the United States 
‘retries’ its idea of justice.”55 
Butler’s arguments are persuasive but idealistic at best.56  
Even if the U.S. Supreme Court’s position changes on affirma-
tive action, Butler’s proposal would be limited if Justice O’Con-
nor’s proposed 25 year sunset on affirmative action prevails.57 
Butler attempts to skirt the substantive infirmities of his proposal 
by couching his requirement for proportionality of arrest and 
imprisonment of African Americans in terms that suggest 
“goals,” not quotas. Even if the proposal were to survive the 
political process, it would not likely survive strict scrutiny.58 
Butler’s racially-based jury nullification proposal suffers on two 
accounts.  The proposal is intentionally radical and subversive59 
and its implementation strategy might give prosecutors a suffi-
ciently race-neutral reason to use preemptory strikes against Af-
rican-American jurors.60  
THE CASE FOR MANDATORY DOWNWARD                 
DEPARTURES IN SENTENCING 
A standardized system of mandatory downward departures 
in sentencing synthesizes two seeming incompatible ideas - 
namely, reduced judicial discretion and the consideration of of-
fender characteristics and mitigating factors. Under this pro-
posal, relevant mitigating factors and offender characteristics 
would be numerically standardized for 
judicial consultation, based on their 
empirical relevance in explaining 
criminal behavior and how often they 
are cited by judges in downward depar-
tures from sentencing.61  Judges would 
consult the standardized form at sen-
tencing to assess the factors and charac-
teristics in a particular case. If the fac-
tors were present, the judge would be 
required to reduce the sentence, accord-
ing to the applicable sentencing guidelines, by the factors’ 
weight.  Judges would retain minimal discretion to depart further 
downward based on factors not enumerated in the form, but 
would be required to provide a written explanation for this de-
parture. Judges would be prevented from considering the race of 
the offender. 
This proposal would have several benefits. First, by defining 
mandatory factors for consideration and virtually eliminating 
judicial discretion, a mandatory downward departure system 
might significantly reduce the effect of racial bias at sentencing62 
and ease the concern that judges will “use departures to impose 
sentences according to their own ideals.”63  By the same token, 
using those mitigating factors most often cited by judges to jus-
tify downward departures ensures that a mandatory departure 
system reflects sentencing considerations judges deem most per-
“A mandatory downward         
departure system reflects a    
modest attempt to preserve     
certain elements of both           
determinate and indeterminate 
schemes in an objective        
package.” 
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tinent. 
Second, to the extent that the selected mitigating factors are 
disproportionately present in cases involving African-American 
offenders, mandatory departures based on these factors may 
close the racial disparity gap between African Americans and 
White Americans without relying on race. Downward departures 
as a means of closing this racial gap would be far less vulnerable 
to a constitutional challenge, would potentially reduce sentenc-
ing disparities with respect to other minorities, and could foster 
increased confidence in the criminal justice system among Afri-
can Americans.  
Third, a mandatory downward departure system comports 
well with the rough consensus among legislators and commenta-
tors that mitigating factors and offender characteristics should be 
considered at sentencing.64 Thus, the proposal would ensure the 
consistency which indeterminate sentencing schemes lack. 
Lastly, to the extent that sentences 
are ultimately reduced across the 
board, a mandatory downward de-
parture system might help to reduce 
prison overcrowding and correc-
tional costs, a growing concern in 
many states with determinate sen-
tencing.65 Moreover, the system con-
tinues to stress deterrence and inca-
pacitation as society’s preferred 
goals of punishment in order to 
equalize the system. Criminals are 
not “coddled” by this system, but 
merely treated as equally and fairly 
as possible. 
Objections to indeterminate sen-
tencing schemes recognize that the system’s discretionary nature 
invites the influence of racial bias at sentencing, invariably lead-
ing to disproportionately severe sentencing outcomes for African 
Americans.  By the same token, determinate sentencing schemes 
either do not give judges adequate leeway to individualize sen-
tences, or are voluntary in nature and therefore susceptible to the 
same infirmities found in indeterminate sentencing schemes. 
Inadequate consideration of mitigating factors and circumstances 
disproportionately impact African Americans.   
This proposal is vulnerable to several criticisms.  First, a 
mandatory downward departure system may only increase the 
influence of prosecutorial discretion in charging decisions, which 
greatly influences sentencing.66  Prosecutors may begin to 
“charge strategically to gain the upper hand in plea negotiations 
or introduce evidence of prior criminal activity or aggravating 
circumstances at trial.”67  Because of the courts’ extreme defer-
ence to prosecutors, resulting sentencing disparities would likely 
continue. However, this proposal presumes that sentencing re-
form will not occur in a vacuum. Concomitant reforms in other 
areas of the criminal justice system, like prosecutorial discretion, 
may help manage this problem.68   
Second, this proposal would be vulnerable to an equal pro-
tection challenge despite being race neutral.69 Since strict scru-
tiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact,”70 a race-neutral manda-
tory downward departure system ostensibly aimed at reducing 
racial sentencing disparities, particularly for African-American 
offenders, might be seen as presumptively invalid even if it si-
multaneously helps White Americans. Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court will tolerate remedies addressing the under-
representation of racial minorities which define in a race neutral 
manner “the disadvantages... that racial minorities disproportion-
ately face.”71  
A third objection might lie in the U.S. Supreme Court’s re-
cent decisions in Blakely v. Washington73 and United States v. 
Booker,74 which rendered both state and federal sentencing 
guideline essentially advisory. The concern of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in those cases, however, was the judicial enhancement of 
sentences above the maximum dictated by statute based on facts 
not decided by the jury,75 which violated 
the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.76 
A mandatory downward departure system 
presents the converse situation and, there-
fore, would not implicate the Sixth 
Amendment but instead pursues the per-
missible goal of sentencing parity.77 
      Perhaps the strongest objections to 
this proposal are the further reductions of 
judicial discretion and its low political 
viability. Determinate schemes have been 
criticized for being  rigid and difficult to 
apply.78 The Supreme Court clearly pre-
fers maintaining as much judicial sen-
tencing discretion as possible.79 Further-
more, this proposal appears to coddle 
criminals, particularly violent criminals, at a time when citizens 
are siding with politicians who adhere to tough crime policies.  
But most of the criticism has been directed towards the lack of 
judicial discretion to consider offender characteristics in order to 
adjust sentences downward. This proposal for mandatory down-
ward departures would squarely address that issue.  While ware-
housing criminals for long periods of time may help reduce 
crime to a minor extent in the short term, it hardly constitutes a 
long term solution.80 
A mandatory downward departure system reflects a modest 
attempt to preserve certain elements of both determinate and 
indeterminate sentencing schemes in an objective package. It is 
by no means a panacea for racial disparities in sentencing or for 
all of the ills afflicting the criminal justice system. Rather, it is 
an additional tool that can be used to achieve the ultimate goals 
of racial parity and fairness in sentencing.   Perhaps, if such a 
system had been in place in Virginia a decade ago, Allen would 
have received a fair and just sentence for his misdeeds; one that 
would have allowed him to return to society two years ago in-
stead of seven years from now.81 
“A Bureau of Justice Statistics 
study on trends in discretionary 
and mandatory parole reported 
that, on average, African     
Americans remain incarcerated 
three months longer than White 
Americans in discretionary and 
seven months longer than White 
Americans in mandatory state 
parole systems.” 
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